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The purpose of this paper is to analyze some additional issues related to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and to the development of regional integration agreements (RIA). We 
include additional variables to the baseline model of FDI determinants developed by 
Lopez and Orlicki and presented previously in this document. These variables are 
related to the external sector and to the relative size of economies that are involved in 
each bilateral relationship and they allow us to obtain some conclusions about FDI 
expansion forms in MERCOSUR countries and to progress in the analysis of which 
could be transnational corporations (TNC) most probably strategies in the frame work 
of new integration agreements, particularly, if it is possible that some of these 
enterprises could follow complex integration strategies.  
 
Secondly, as estimations with the general model only allow to capture the average 
impact of integration agreements, the analysis of “winners” and “losers” is 
disaggregated at country level, with the purpose to consider possible effects of 
agreements on each MERCOSUR country in the frame work of ALCA and 
MERCOSUR-EU.  
 
FDI bilateral flows and trade openness 
 
World bilateral flows of FDI increased between 1983 and 2003. Flows from the 
European Union (EU) had a clear predominance and determined the global trend. EU 
flows also induced a strong fluctuation in the global trend of world FDI in 1998-2002. 
The increase of bilateral FDI flows observed at the end of the nineties has been 
strongly associated with the wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that 
have been mainly concentrated on enterprises of developed countries. The European 
transnational corporations (TNC) have played the main role in this progress. They have 
fulfilled near 70% of the purchases, between 1998 and 2000 
 
Bilateral FDI flows to MERCOSUR countries have shown a similar trend with global 
flows. During the eighties the inflows to the region were very low, although they tended 
to grow slightly. From the first years of the nineties these inflows increased sharply. At 
the end of this decade, in accordance with the evolution of world FDI, MERCOSUR 
countries duplicated the inflow of FDI. The principal source of this FDI was the EU 
countries and their investments were mostly related to the privatization of public 
enterprises at the beginning of the decade, and to the wave of cross-border mergers 
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and acquisitions observed in the world at the late 90’s. The importance of this trend 
makes necessary to discriminate a more “normal” period of FDI inflows to the region 
(1984-1997) to evaluate the conclusions that we could extract when we incorporate in 
the model a phenomenon that is unlikely to happen in the next future with such 
magnitude.  
 
Different theoretical approaches propose that the most open economies are those that 
have the greatest possibilities to capture FDI. Traditional expansion forms of TNCs 
(horizontal or market seeking) could be yielding space to vertical or complex forms 
which involve more intensive external trade. It could be possible to associate a great 
level of external openness with more open transnational expansion forms which could 
attract FDI, particularly FDI from developed to developing countries. This relationship 
between FDI and external openness would appear to be confirmed by some examples: 
the member of Agreement of South Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Hong 
Kong and Korea as well as Mexico and Central America Common Market (CACM) 





The combination of different theoretical issues presented in some analytical 
frameworks, particularly Markusen’s “knowledge-capital” model and a set of typology of 
TNC strategies (for example Dunning, 1993; Trajtenberg and Vigorito, 1982; and 
UNCTAD, 1993), can contribute to define the variable set to be included in the 
descriptive model and to identify predominant transnational expansion forms. 
Markusen and Maskus (2001) indicate the existence of two basic models to include 
transnational firms in the traditional theoretical approaches of international trade: the 
“horizontal” and the “vertical” model. The first model could characterize most FDI flows 
among developed countries, where TNCs would obtain advantages over domestic 
firms, by the presence of economies of scale at the firm level. The second model would 
typify north-south FDI flows. However north-south and south-south flows may also be 
horizontal if there are high trade barriers to imports. These authors integrate both 
models in a new theoretical frame (“knowledge-capital” model), using this model they 
suggest that affiliates’ production and trade tend to be substitutes between similar 
countries, and to be complementary when countries have great differences in their 
relative factor endowment.  
 
It is important to consider simultaneously the question of transnational expansion forms 
and FDI determinants, to do so in the baseline model we include two additional 
variables: Simisize, an indicator of similar countries size which could allow to capture 
horizontal transnational expansion forms; and XMH that represents the external 
openness of the host economy. 
 
The World Investment Reports (2004) recognized the increasingly importance of the 
“complex integration strategies” followed by TNCs, which have been defined by Yeaple 
(2003) as those which establish affiliates in some foreign countries to avoid transport 
cost and establish affiliates in others to take advantage of factor price differentials. This 
strategy creates complementarities between the two types of affiliates. The explanation 
of when TNCs follow complex integration strategies is that “north-north and north-south 
FDI reduce the cost of serving international markets in complementary ways, creating 
complementarities between the two forms of FDI”. The variables used in the 
modelization to consider the effects of “FDI creation”, “FDI diversion”, and “FDI dilution” 
are strongly associated with the horizontal and vertical FDI, but they are not associated 
with a possible transition between both forms of FDI. We discriminate the general 
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model between countries’ blocs with the purpose to include some dimension of this 
strategy. 
 
The formation of a regional integration agreement (RIA) can imply more extra regional 
investment for the region as a whole but this does not mean more FDI in each member 
of the RIA. FDI may have an unequal distribution across countries that form the 
regional agreement. Within a RIA there may be winners and losers, in terms of the 
amount of FDI received for each country. What determines whether a particular country 
win or lose? Most literature on RIA and FDI find that one of the factors that may explain 
who loses and who wins is country size. Levy, Stein and Daude (2003) considered that 
the bigger losers could be the medium-size countries, since small countries are more 
likely to be supplied by trade rather than FDI, with or without the RIA. On the other 
hand, countries that offer a more attractive package for foreign investors due to the 
quality of their institutions, the quality of their labor force, their tax treatment of TNCs 
and the development of their infrastructure could be winners. 
 
Te Velde and Bezemer (2004) found that the larger the country is relative to others in 
the region, the more FDI it will attract. Also, they considered that poorer countries in a 
region are not necessary which attract less FDI. Te Velde and Fahnbulleh (2003) 
suggested that if integration leads to more FDI with equal benefits to the member of the 
RIA, it could start a virtuous circle, so cooperation to joint investment promotion may 
bring benefits across the region. 
 
What countries can do to become FDI winners or increase their capacity to attract FDI, 
in the regional integration? In this paper we formulate some hypothesis about how a 
RIA can affect FDI determinants. The evidence discussed in Levy, Stein, Daude (2003) 
suggests that improve in the attraction capacity may be smaller for countries that have 
similar factor endowments that those of the source countries, and are relatively closed 
to international trade. The same authors (2002b) demonstrate that countries that 
present a more attractive overall package to foreign investors are also likely to gain 




A first interesting issue is that host country GDP has not a significant coefficient, when 
internal market size and dynamics are the most significant variables in FDI determinant 
studies. This fact would be indicating a change in FDI forms from horizontal to vertical 
and/or complex. The form that FDI among countries adopts allows us to profile winners 
and losers related to FDI flows in the framework of regional integration agreements. 
 
Other result that reinforce previous one is the positive relationship between FDI flows 
and trade openness. The variable which measure FDI internal creation effect for EU 
countries loses significance when we include trade openness in the model, because 
the principal market of EU exports is the own region and intra-European trade operates 
as determinant of trade openness which has a positive effect on FDI flows. This result 
indicates that one of the principal determinants of FDI flows would be the increase of 
trade flows (as a consequence of integration agreement or through other factors). 
When we evaluate possible agreements to enlarge MERCOSUR integration, this 
behavior must be taken into account. If this enlargement implies increased trade flows, 
they could have associated increased FDI flows. The sign of the agreement is not 
sufficient to increase FDI inflows, thus it is necessary a previous or simultaneous 
change in MERCOSUR countries’ strategy of predominant international insertion. 
 
When we reduce the period of analysis to remove distortions generated by the process 
of mergers and acquisitions developed in the nineties, the results show that FDI 
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increase could be associated to external creation of FDI in countries that would 
integrate FTAA as well as in EU.  
 
Horizontal FDI (oriented to internal market) would predominate in bilateral flows among 
developed countries; elasticity associated to GDP of source country is the only 
significant variable to explain movement of FDI flows. In FDI flows between developed 
and developing countries, other variables besides GDP of source country are 
significant: trade openness, politic risk, privatizations, inflation and bilateral investment 
treaties, so these results would indicate that horizontal forms of transnational 
expansion are not the principal determinants of bilateral FDI movements. 
 
Previous hypothesis would be supported in the results obtained when we differentiate 
exports of host countries by type of good. In the case of FDI among developed 
countries none export variables were significant. In FDI from developed to developing 
countries, the results show that open expansion forms of “resource seeking” type 
(natural resources and labor) would be predominant to explain the pattern of FDI 
movement. In this case the variation of total exports is positive and significant as well 
as exports of primary or more intensive in natural resources goods, but exports of 
industrial or with greater technological content goods seems to impact negatively and 
significantly in the increase of bilateral FDI flows. May be, complex international 
integration forms are progressing slower than we have foreseen in other works or these 
variables are not the best to capture this impact. Previous results could be indicating 
that if ALCA and MERCOSUR-EU agreements would increase trade flows –as is 
foreseeable- and those flows would have a positive impact on FDI flows, predominant 
forms of expansion would be open/resource seeking forms, since these agreements 
implies relationships between developed and developing countries. 
 
In relation to which MERCOSUR countries would be winners or losers as attractors of 
FDI in the framework of regional integration agreements, the estimation results, using a 
special methodological approach, show that Brazil would be the only “winner” inside 
the bloc and Argentina would be probably the “loser”, when we consider external 
creation of FDI.  On the other hand, in small economies results are not so significant, 
but they would be showing a situation where Uruguay is near to be a “winner” and 
Paraguay a “loser”, both in relation to its. 
 
A significant factor, in FDI flows increase in MERCOSUR countries, has been the 
exports growth from the bloc to developed countries. This would indicate that 
investment in the region has a certainly correlation degree with trade flows from 
MERCOSUR countries. If integration agreements with EU as well as with NAFTA 
would be materialized, MERCOSUR would receive increasing FDI flows associated 
with additional trade flows that these agreements could generate. These considerations 
for the whole MERCOSUR are applied to Brazil; while in Argentina the principal FDI 
determinants would be internal market and privatization of public services process 
(trade flows seem to affect FDI flows in a decreasing form). Previous results would be 
reaffirming that Brazil would be a “winner” and Argentina a “loser” (trade flows are not 
significant in FDI to Paraguay and Uruguay). 
 
The results of winners and losers analysis are not sufficiently robust to allow us to 
project potential impacts of ALCA and EU agreements on FDI flows to MERCOSUR 
countries. The gravitational model does not capture in an appropriate way phenomena 
or FDI forms that had a great weight during the period of analysis. In the other hand, it 
is very difficult to include control variables in these models, taking into account that 
there are not countries comparable to those of MERCOSUR that have previous 
experience in enlarged agreements with EU or NAFTA. 
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On the contrary, the identification of FDI forms that lead bilateral relationships seems to 
offer a better option to project the effects of agreements with North countries. 
Particularly, it would be possible to establish a link between trade flows potential 
increase and FDI that would receive MERCOSUR countries, if we associate the 
agreements with a change in actually dominant FDI forms in MERCOSUR, from 
horizontal to vertical or complex (the last associated with trade flows, in developing 
countries perspective). The results sustain the hypothesis that trade flows growth is the 
determinant of a great part of intra-European FDI (and probably of FDI received by 
Mexico when this country integrated the NAFTA), more than the sign of the integration 
agreement. In other words, if the integration agreement does not generate new trade 
flows (before, simultaneously or as a consequence of FDI received), it will be difficult to 
increase FDI flows in a significant way. 
 
How this structure of winners and losers could be modified if ALCA and MERCOSUR-
EU agreements are signed and applied? How many countries would be in better 
conditions to make a change towards export strategies, those that would be 
beneficiated by integration agreements? 
 
About these questions we can only offer some tentative answers related to future most 
likely stages. A possibility is that ALCA and EU agreements expand differences in 
external capture of FDI, and Brazil and Uruguay tend to strengthen as winners while 
Argentina and Paraguay as losers. 
 
Brazil, on the base of its greater industrial development and sustained in the 
development of  internal scale economies, could present a major potential to go from 
“market seeking” strategies of TNCs’ affiliates to strongly exports strategies, supported 
by exports to other developing countries and some specialized exports to developed 
countries. 
 
Uruguay with its potential related to its geographical location as entry and exit to 
MERCOSUR as well as a better development of its natural resources could move 
towards vertical or complex strategies. The principal problem could be to induce entry 
TNCs to produce goods with greater value added in the framework of their vertical 
strategies that are dominants in this country. This could avoid or compensate the 
tendency of FDI natural resource oriented to generate “enclaves”.  
 
Argentina appears as an intermediate situation case. Its potential transformation to 
export strategies, beyond natural resources, seems to depend increasingly on the 
possibility of obtaining scale economies inside MERCOSUR. Nowadays, this situation 
appears as very complicated. 
 
The central problem for Argentina and Uruguay consist in their very low average long 
run growth rates related strongly to volatility of both economies. To those countries, 
which economies are particularly interconnected, a greater integration to MERCOSUR, 
principally with Brazil, is a key aspect for a possible industrial. 
 
Paraguay is the most concerned case by its intra-territoriality, poverty levels, recently 
economic evolution and high levels of informality of its economy. These issues make 
Paraguay as the country with less potential to capture FDI related to other bloc’s 
members.    
    
